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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACT OF 23 AUGUST, 1944 IN THE 
GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
Anca OLTEAN
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminaries 
The factors who determined the success of the act that took place in August 23, 
1944 were: the continuity of the activity of political parties at the level of their leadership, 
the precarity of the situation of Romania on Eastern front, fact that lead the political 
leaders of the time towards the finding of some solutions, and the action of King Mihai.  
In what concerns the first factor, this was favourized by the fact that “Antonescu 
did not enterprise anything in order to limit at least the contacts and the discussions from 
the framework of the opposition” (Constantiniu, 1997: 395). On the contrary, it had been 
always a dialogue between Antonescu and the leaders of the Opposition: Iuliu Maniu, 
Dinu Brătianu and Constantin Titel Petrescu. These leaders criticised Antonescu in the 
moment when he decided to cross the Nister and to continue the fight on the territory of 
the Soviet Union. It had been also weaknesses coming from the part of Iuliu Maniu who 
declined allways the responsibility concerning the signing of the armistice. He did not 
want to assume the responsability of the cease of some parts from the national territory 
(Bessarabia, the North of Bucovina and the land of Herţa), agreeing all that this 
responsability had to be granted to the Marshall. In spite of these endeavours, neither 
Antonescu is not disposed to sign the armistice (he was asserting that he is ready to give 
the power to the Opposition, if their leaders assumed the responsability of such step), 
neither the Anglo-Americans did not seem receptive towards the fears of democratic 
parties concerning the future of Romania. Coming from here, the long waitings and 
pertractations of the leader of National Party of Peasants, Iuliu Maniu (Constantiniu, 1997: 
395).  
                                                     
*
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Abstract. Looking back at the important action from 23 August 1944 when Romania 
left the war on the side of Germany and ceased the fight with the Soviet Union, an action 
who contributed to the shortening considerably of the war and to the demise of Fascism and 
Holocaust in Europe, we have to acknowledge the important role played by King Mihai and 
democratic political forces from Romania like the leaders Iuliu Maniu, Gheorhe Brătianu 
(leaders of PNL and PNT) in the democratization of Romania and liberation from fascist 
experience. Unfortunately, the transformation of the state in communist state could not be 
prevented by these liberal and democratic forces, neither by monarchy in the context of lack 
of international support for the maintenance of capitalist, western-orriented state. 
Keywords: 23 August, Fascism, Communism, Holocaust, King Mihai, democratic 
Opposition 
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In what it concerns the precarity of external situation of Romania that lead to the 
inevitability of the act of 23 August, I will mention a few moments concerning the 
position of Romania in the context of the outburst of the war.  
The marshall let himself angrenatted in the conflict and he declared his loyalty 
towards Hitler that, starting the war against Soviet Union, did ask to Antonescu to do only 
what was in his own interest. In the vision of the Marshall, the war was not only one of 
liberation of the Romanian territories found under Soviet domination, but also against of 
an ideological enemy, the bolshevism.  
An aspect that it can be repproached to Antonescu is that he kept King Mihai 
outside the politics, about the entrance in the war of Romania, King Mihai finding from 
BBC.  
At July 2, 1941, Antonescu opened the offensive on Eastern front. It followed then 
the elliberation of the Romanian territory at July 25, 1941 and eliberation of the Chişinău 
at July 16, 1941. The passing over the Niester, after the liberation of Bassarabia and the 
North of Bucovina, was criticised by leaders of National Party of Peasants and Liberal 
Party. Antonescu motivated his decision. (Constantiniu, 1997: 403) It was innitiated by a 
strategic calculus in order of not exposing the Romanian territory to Soviet attacks, but it 
had also a political motivation, having as purpose the fulfillment of German doleances 
with the purpose of obtaing ulteriourly the annulation of the Diktate of Vienna. This was 
the motif of collaboration of Antonescu with Germany, he being on the side of Germans, 
unconditionatly.  
In August 30, 1941, he signed the Romanian- German agreement from Tighina 
that it foreseen the instauration of Romanian civil administration on the territory between 
Nistru and Bug named Transnistria.  
The signs of bad luck came up since the Battle of Odessa (August 18–Octombrie 
16, 1941) when the Romanian army lost 98 000 of people (death persons, injured, missing 
persons). (Constantiniu, 1997: 408) In the same time, the Germans lost the Battle of 
Moscow where they applied the Blitzkrieg. After the entrance of United States in the war 
(December 7, 1941), the balance of forces changed in favor of the allies. Romania and 
USA declared simultaneosly the war. In 1942, the Romanian troups fought at South of 
Harkov and at Sevastopol. Another important defeat was at Stalingrad where the 
Romanian army lost 158 854 militaries (Constantinescu, 1997: 415), this fact causing a 
crises of trust between the High Commandaments Romanian and German.  
Besides the defeat from the Cotul Donului and Calmuca stepa, the Romanian 
army suffered the defeat from Kursk (July 5-August 23, 1943) that, coroborated with the 
leaving out of Mussolini in Italy at July 25, 1943, worsen the situation from Eastern Front. 
It was more probable that Romania to be occupied by the Russians. The Romanians did 
not know that at Teheran (November 28-December 1, 1943), Stalin, Roosevelt and 
Churchill rejected the plan of the Anglo-American debarcation in the Balkans. At March 
5-April 17, 1944, the Soviet troups entered on the territory of Romania. At April 2, 1944, 
the Red Army came in the Old Kingdom. The declaration of Molotov showed that the 
Soviets entered the territory of Romania not from the wish of taking over of a part of the 
country or to impose another social system, but from purely strategic reasons. This 
assertion proved ulteriourly untrue, being a politic-diplomatic lie.  
In what it concerns the third factor, King Mihai I, he played a role that can not be 
contested. Although he was advised and councilled by the representatives of BND 
(peasant party members, liberalls, social-democrats, communists), he was the main 
innitiator of the act of 23 August. Later, the communists arrogated the role of main 
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5 
coordinators of the events. The main character of those days was King Mihai that hurried 
the rythm of events during the day of August 23, the innitial action being fixed on August 
26. At August 23, the king acted alone, the leaders of the main political parties were not to 
be found.  
 
The evolution of events 
The Act of 23 August was prepared since 1942. At Cairo, Barbu Ştirbei tried to 
negociate with the allies, but his action was stopped by Antonescu who received from 
Hitler the promise that Transilvanya will become a part of Romania. Hitler, basing himself 
on the Marshall’s loyalty, renounced to the plan Margareta II who foreseen the occupation 
of Romania by the Nazi forces. In the meantime, in October 1943, the Romanian vice-
consul to Istanbul was taking the connection with a representative of S.O.E. (Special 
Operation Executive) and he was presenting the plan of a stately insurrection in order to 
eliminate the Marshall. This action failed thow, partly because of the lack of British forces 
support. (Giurăscu, 1995: 1) 
With the help of Maniu and Brătianu, the king was trying to organize and also, 
Maniu could send news and inform the Allies at Cairo and Ankara. (Ciobanu, 1997: 18) 
After this transmission of news, Maniu and Brătianu used to come to Palace to make a 
rapport of their action.  
In order to be able to cooperate with the Allies, the King was compelled to 
receive, also, communist members, in the future actions that followed, although their 
number was very small. The actions of the King, were to a very small extent based on 
exteriour action. Thus, on one hand, at BBC and the Voice of America, they were advised 
to get out from the war, and, on the other hand, the message of Romanians towards the 
Allies were not confirmed: “We were working intensively to reach a viable solution, but 
as the time was going by, we realized we had no help from anyone and that exactly the 
ones who lead us to get out of the war, they end all actions when we wanted to propose 
something more concrete”. (Ciobanu, 1997: 20)  
Finding out that Antonescu had to go on the Front, although the date for the 
proposed action was 26 August, the king had convocated the Marshall to the Palace, 
together with the Ministry of External Affairs, Mihai Antonescu. In August 22, Maniu, 
Brătianu, Titel Petrescu and Pătrăşcanu were not to be found. King Mihai received the two 
Antonescu in the presence of Sănătescu and tried to convince the Marshall of the necessity 
of signing the armistice. For Antonescu, his word of honour given to Hitler worthed more 
than the situation in which was the country, thus he refused to give his consent. The 
marshall did not feel the danger of his situation, he continued to see King Mihai as a child 
who had to be kept out of politics. He asserted that he can not go and to leave the country 
in the hand of a child. The solution that came up was that of the arrestment of Antonescu 
after which his collaborators were called to Palace and arrested. Maniu, Brătianu, Titel 
Petrescu, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu were named ministers without portofolio in the new 
government.  
The communists were unpleasantly surprised by the spontaneous action of the 
King who put them in the situation of not asserting the paternity of the Political Act from 
August 23. This aspect did not imperished the communist journals (Scânteia) to declare, 
since the second day, that them, the communists, were the main innitiators of the events.  
In the same time, it started the bombing of the Germans towards the capital. The 
King took a refuge in Olteniţa, at Dobriţa. They were taken 50 000 of German prisoners. 
The Russians interrupted the offensive hoping that the Romanians be defeated by the 
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Germans. On the Eastern Front, the Romanian troops were treated as prisoners. Russians 
entered in the Capital in September 1, after the leaving of German troops in August 26.  
Another problem that aroused controversies was the surrender of Antonescu to the 
Soviets. He was left in the surveillance of Emil Bodnăraş who gave him to the Russians, 
without having the King’s consent.  
 
The Act of August 23, 1944 (event, signification, the role of King Mihai)  
At August 22, Antonescu comes back to Bucharest and talks with Mihalache and 
Gh. Brătianu who ask him to conclude the armistice. With the support of the Opposition, 
Antonescu seemed to agree to sign the amistice. Gheorghe Brătianu promised to bring 
letters of guarantee from Maniu and Brătianu. Antonescu asked for an audience to Palace 
for 16.oo p.m. and in the discussions with the political leaders of the time the king 
decides, that if the marshall would be not agree with the signing of the armistice, to arrest 
him during the audience.  
The discussion King Mihai-Antonescu developed in contradictorial terms. To the 
assertion of Ion Antonescu that he can not accept the conditions of the armistice, the king 
told him: “We can not bargain at this late hour and in the situation in which we are”. 
Antonescu proposed to call back the Romanian troupes and to organize a resistance in the 
Carpathians, but the king opposed asserting that the whole country will transformed into 
ruins. The marshal is arrested. The monarch was criticized later, that he gave the marshal 
to the communists of Emil Bodnăraş to watch him.  
At August 23, 8 o’clock p.m., in a royal decree, Constantin Sănătescu was named 
president of the Council of Ministers. The new government included a representative of 
each party from BND. The majority of the government, was formed by military 
technicians.  
At 21.30 p.m., all the radio stations from the country announced that they will 
transmite an important comunicate for the country. At 22, 12 o’clock p.m., it had began 
the transmission of the proclamation. The proclamation was containing the leading 
message of King Mihai I, addressed to Romanian Army to stop the war against Soviet 
Union and to turn back the guns against the Germans. The fact that Romanian army was 
subjected to him, demonstrates that the king remained in the eyes of the army the head of 
the troops, although Antonescu ignored this prerogative of him. The fact that in the night 
of 23/ 24 August it took place spontaneous manifestations in front of the Palace 
demonstrates the fact that the king was enjoying popularity and trust in the eyes of the 
people. On August 26, 1944, the Romanian army liberated Bucharest found under German 
occupation, and in Octomber 25, the last Romanian city, Carei, was liberated from the 
German occupation. The act of August 23, was an action meant to support the United 
Nations and, especially, the Soviet Union, but, unfortunately, the Russians did not 
appreciated the gesture of the monarch. The Romanian army, after the proclamation of 
August 23, opposed no more resistance to the Soviets. These occupied the whole territory 
of Romania, taking over 130. 000 of prisoners.  
The meaning of the Act of August 23 was highly important. After turning the 
weapons against the Nazi forces, Romania, the second country as surface in Eastern 
Europe, changed in a few days the line of the front with 500 of kilometers. This thing 
happened with the price of numerous victims, Romania lost 500 000 of soldiers on Eastern 
front and 168 000 on Western front. The act of August 23, had a special meaning also for 
the situation of Romania. In the opinion of Şerban Papacostea (Papacostea, Revista 22, 
23-30 August 1995), the Act of August 23, had numerous significations such as: to avoid 
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the transformation of the country in a theatre of war, to avoid the direct occupation by the 
Soviet army and the immediate taking over of the power by the exponents of Soviet 
interest, the communists, the return of Ardeal to the Kingdom of Romania and the 
annulment of the Diktate of Vienna because of the participation of the Romanian army to 
the military operations together with the allies, the reducement of the war time period on 
all fronts, because of the huge vacuum provoked by the action of Romania in the 
defensive system of the Reich.  
King Mihai played the key-role in these events. Although he was helped and 
adviced by the representatives of BND (nationalist peasants, liberals, social-democrats and 
communists), he was the main initiator of the act. Ulteriourly, the communists arrogated 
themselves the right of main innitiators and actors in the events of the act of August 23, 
but the reality was completely different. In 1944, Romanian Communist Party had a 
reduced number of members and it was accepted to negociations only because it was 
hoped that the implication of the communits in action, will determine the acceptance by 
the Soviet Union of some easier conditions of armistice with Romania. There are also 
opinions that minimalizes the role had by King Mihai in this operation, using the same 
discours that Ion Antonescu used when he isolated the king by the political realities and 
the roles he had under the pretext that he was nothing more than a child. Thus, in an 
interview granted to Gabriela Adameşanu, Ion Iliescu asserts that the Act from August 23 
“was not his merit (of the king) in principal, as it was accredited. A young men of 22 years 
old…But I appreciated and I considered that it is right this justification, the fact that he 
contributed to the achievement of this turning back of the weapons against Germany and 
to the ralliation of Romanian military forces to the forces of United Nations-participation 
to Romania to war until the defeat of Germany”. (transl.) (Ion Iliescu Apud Adameşanu, 
Revista 22, 12-19 October 1994).  
The Act of August 23 and its significations were acknowledged also in 
international plan. Thus, at July 6, 1945, the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Soviet Union 
granted to King Mihai the Order Victoria, the highest military Soviet distinction. With the 
same appreciation the president of the United States, Harry Truman names Mihai I as 
Chief Commander of the Legion of Merit. In spite of these distinctions which openly 
acknowledged the role of the King in the solutionning of the Second World War, the 
situation evolved differently. The Romanian communists supported by the Soviet Union, 
the indifference of Great Britain and of the United States of America, who accepted that 
Romania to arrive in the Soviet sphere of influence, the lack of diplomacy of adjunct of 
Soviet minister, Andrei Vâşinsky who came in Romania in order to exert pressions of the 
king and of the democratic forces in the country, all these lead to the end of monarchy and 
of the political democratic regime of Romania.  
Towards this situation king Mihai adopted a cooperant attitude towards the Soviet 
Union not knowing from the very beginning which were her real intentions, then he tried 
to oppose to the communization of the country through actions that culminated with the 
royal strike started in 20.02. 1945. The end of royal strike and the acceptance of Groza 
Government was the beginning of a policy of concessions and resignation in front of 
Moscow and of the communists supported by it. King Michael had understood that he can 
do nothing to change the situation. In time, only by his simple presence, the monarch 
become persona non grata and he is imposed the act of abdication. The attitude of 
Romanian communists was not from the start hostile to the monarch, they knew about the 
prestige of the monarch: “In Romania, it was created an unusual political phenomenon. 
Here, the communists trained by/in Soviet Union, unlike the communists in general who 
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hated the monarchy praise the merits of royalty. No one from the communist ministers 
miss the occasion to appear in public or official occasions together with King Mihai”. 
(Deletant, Revista 22, nr.9, March 1995) 
 
The reflection of events from August 23, 1944 in the press of the time 
At August 23, 1944, at 22 o’clock, King Mihai was announcing his Proclamation 
to the country. It represents the moment of the rupture of the relations with Germany. The 
Crown and the Throne were becoming the only factors of balance in a country ruined by 
the war: “The Romanian people understands to be itself master on his destiny. Anybody 
would stay against our decision freely taken and which do not undermine anybody’s 
rights, is an enemy of our people. I order to the army and I call the people to fight by all 
means and with any sacrifices against him. All the citizens to gather around the Throne 
and Government, for the salvation of the Mother country”. (Universul, nr.231: 25 august 
1944) In the same time, it was transmitted also a declaration of the Government through 
which it was announced the formation of a BND government, the country receiving 
benefits of independence from the side of USSR, USA and Great Britain. With this 
occasion, it was formulated the option of Romanians to take back Transylvania: “The 
acknowledgement by the governments from Moscow, London, Washington of the 
injustices made to Romania by the Dictate of Vienna opens the possibility that the 
Romanian armies together with allied armies to liberate Northern Transylvania under the 
foreign occupation”. (Universul, nr.231: 25 august 1944)  
The king named a new government together with General of Army Corpus 
Constantin Sănătescu as president of the Council of Ministers. The members of the 
Government became Iuliu Maniu, Constantin Brătianu, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and 
Constantin Titel Petrescu. Other portofolios were occupied by the general Mihail Racoviţă 
(secretary minister to the department of National Defense, Grigore Niculescu Buzeşti 
(secretary minister at the department of Foreign Affairs), the general Aldea Aurel 
(secretary minister at the department of Internal Affairs). Other ministers were: general 
Nicolae Marinescu, Dimitrie Negel, general Ion Boiţeanu, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu (minister at 
the Justice Department).  
In August 26, the legionnaire movement was destroyed. The Constitution from 
1923 came into force.  
Through the Act of August 23, the power is detained by the monarch, after, during 
four years, this was subordonated to the Marshall: “Thrown away, from the columns of the 
newspapers by the photographical exhibitions of the dictator and of his family, surveyed 
in the most inoffensive movements, isolated in the narrow circle of the Court and being 
forbidden to take contact with the chiefs of the army and with the political men, deprived 
by all information, the King and Queen Mother had an existence of martyrs”. (Lugosianu, 
Universul, no. 246: 1944) 
Although the communists arrogated later the role of the main initiators of the Act 
of 23 August, the mass–media of the time acknowledged in all newspapers, no matter of 
their political orientation, the role of King Mihai I in the development of the events. Thus 
in the liberal newspaper “Viitorul” it is asserted ca “M.S. King Mihai I, taking the leading 
of the state from unskilled hands and giving back to the people, besides the spread 
liberties, on the wire of its traditional politics, he cemented once more the ties that unite 
our glorious dynasty with the Romanian People”. (Zurescu, Viitorul, 29 august 1944:1) In 
“Greater Romania”, the paper of communist orientation, it is acknowledged in the same 
time the role of the King”. His Majesty the King never ceased for a moment to prepare the 
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action fulfilled at August 23, action in the view the presence of the Majesty in the midst of 
the nation was as simple, as indispensable act”. (România liberă, nr.18, 2 Septembrie, 
1944: 1)  
The solidarity with the monarchy had not excluded, also, the solidarity with the 
Red Army. Thus, the press of the time publishes elogious articles at the address of Soviet 
Union and of Red Army: “The winning troupes of the Red Army entered yesterday in the 
capital. Young, vigorous, admirably equipped, framed in a total discipline they bring not 
only the quiet pride of some brilliant victories, but also the conscience of a mission of 
liberation against a detested enemy on all the world territory” (Universul, nr. 239, 31 
august, 1944:1). In the same world of ideas he wrote, also, the journal “Free Romania” 
(“România liberă”): “The great Red Army, the strongest and most glorious army of the 
Great United Nations entered in August 30 in the democrat Bucharest…This day will 
enter in the history of our country. The workers and the citizens of the capital, in a 
continuous enthusiasm, received the allied army of Soviet Union with flowers and flags, 
with endless ovations (…)”. (România Liberă, 31 August 1944: 1)  
The press of the time debated, also, the problem of the closing of the armistice. It 
was signed from the allied part by General Rodeon Malonovski and from Romania by 
Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, general adjunct Dămăceanu, Barbu Ştirbei and Ghiţă Pop. The text of 
armistice was stipulating that at the date of August 23, 1944, Romania lost the military 
operations against USSR. Romania was carrying the war against Germany and Hungary 
with the purpose of restauring the independance and soveiregnity of Romania. To this 
campaign, they were participating 12 divisions of infantry. The military operations against 
Germany and Hungary could be put under the general command of the Higher Allied 
Comandment (Sovietic). Romania had to ensure to the Soviet forces and to the other alies 
more easeness for their free movement on the territory of Romania. It had to support the 
expenses of the war and it had to re-establish the frontier with USSR so it was decided by 
the Convention Romanian–Soviet from June 28, 1940. Towards the Russians, they had to 
be delivered all the materials of war of Germany, including the vessels of war anchored in 
the Romanian ports. The government of Romania had to do regularly the payment asked 
to him by the Higher Allied Commandment (Soviet). In the same time, this is oblidged to 
give back to USSR all the values taken during the war but also the payment of some 
compensations of 300 000 of dollars. In turn, “the allied governments think about the 
decisions of the Arbitrage from Vienna with regard to Transylvania as null and inexistent 
and they are agree that Transylvania (or its greatest part of it) to be given back to Romania 
under the condition of the confirmation through the Treaty of Peace”. (Romania Liberă, 
17 September 1944: 1) In “Romania liberă”, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu asserted the necessity of 
the respectation of the armistice. (România Liberă, nr.31, 15 September, 1944) This would  
not undermine the trust of the allies in Romania, especially of Soviet Union.  
They appeared since then severe attacks on the address of the Fascists from the 
communist newspaper “România Liberă”, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu asserted the necessity of 
expectation of the armistice. This would have determined the trust of the Allies in 
Romania, especially of the Soviet Union.  
It appeared since then grave attacks on the address of the fascists from the 
communist newspaper “Free Romania”, fact that constituted later a weapon of the 
communists against all their political adversaries which they accuse with or without basis 
of fascism.  
But, for the moment of the year of 1944, the King Mihai was attributed the role on 
initiator of the political Act from August 23 as a premise of the Convention of Armistice. 
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No one was supposing the turnure which the events will take soon, in the direction of the 
direct subordination of Romania to the Soviet Union and Romanian communists that had 
become simple instruments of the “brother from East”.  
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